In the last three years, there
has been significant growth in the peer-to-peer lending space, particularly
within the student loan segment. While we
applaud the entrance of new funding sources into the student loan market, there
are increasing signs that some of these lenders might face challenges in the
current interest rate environment. These
challenges stem from their use of market-based funding sources, rather than
deposit funding sources like traditional banks.
Market funding, particularly through the use of “warehouse” credit
facilities, can be particularly unstable because market lenders can demand more
collateral against their loans as asset prices fall – what is known as a “margin
call”. If a borrower cannot provide
additional collateral, typically within 24 hours, then the market lender can
seize and liquidate the existing collateral in order to cover their lending
position – a positive feedback loop that amplifies losses. Traditional deposit holding institutions are
insulated from this loop because they can hold their loans to maturity and fund
them through both customer deposits and the Federal Reserve’s discount window. While these traditional banks are still
subject to bank runs and mark-to-market losses, they typically happen much more
slowly than market based borrowers.
To demonstrate how this type of
market based lending can go wrong; let’s take an example where the Student Lender
uses alumni investment to fund a portion of their portfolio and borrows from a
Market Lender for the remaining portion.
In this example, let’s assume that the Student Lender funds their
initial portfolio with 20% alumni investment and 80% debt from a Market
Lender. Let’s further assume that the
portfolio of loans has a fixed coupon rate of 6.25% and a maturity of 10
years. So, for a $100 million portfolio,
the Student Lender would use $20 million of alumni investment and $80 million
of debt from the Market Lender. If we
assume that the Student Lender has accurately priced the risk of the loan
portfolio, then we can determine the market value of the portfolio by
calculating the spread over the equivalent Treasury security; in this case, the
10 year Treasury yield.
Because the Student Lender’s
portfolio has a fixed interest rate, the market value of the portfolio is
subject to change based upon changes in the equivalent Treasury security; in
this case, changes in the 10 year Treasury yield. If 10 year yields go up, then the market value
of portfolio will go down, because investors could readily achieve the same
fixed rate return while buying less risky securities. The figure below shows how the market value
of the loan portfolio would change if the Student Lender had originated the
loans in May of this year.
There are a few very notable
points in this figure. First, we note
that 10 year Treasury rates have increased from 1.75% on May 3, 2013 to 2.88%
today – that is a very large and rapid increase by any historical standard. Correspondingly, we note that the market value
of the Loan Portfolio has fallen ~8% over that same timeframe; however, due to leverage
the value of the alumni investment has fallen by almost 40%. Even more notably, the ratio of Debt to Portfolio Value has increased significantly. In
the third set of rows, we outline a potential 85% Collateral Requirement; in
other words, the Market Lender may stipulate that at no point can the ratio of
Debt to Portfolio Value increase beyond 85%.
In order to rectify any imbalance in this ratio, the Market Lender could
force the Student Lender to post greater collateral through a margin call. We note that, under these assumptions, the
Student Lender would be faced with a $1.6 million margin call at today’s
rates. If the Student Lender is unable
to post that amount –within 24 hours of the request – then the Market Lender
would seize the portfolio and liquidate it in order to recoup its investment,
effectively wiping out the entire Alumni Investment.
Finally, in the last two columns
we have forecasted out the same calculations based upon the prevailing
assumptions for the 10 year Treasury yield.
As you will notice, the implications are not pretty for Alumni
Investors: by March 2014 the Alumni Investors have lost nearly 60% of their
investment and are facing a margin call of nearly $5 million. Now, to be fair, if the Student Lender were a
traditional bank then the equity investors in the bank would face the same
market losses on their investment; however, they would be largely exempt from a
potential margin call, which is the ultimate destabilizing factor in a market
based lending system. Further, from a
borrower perspective none of this may matter: regardless of whether the Student
Lender makes or loses money, the borrower has already locked in the terms of
their loan and will be largely unaffected.
However, borrowers who sign up for alumni lending programs because of
the social aspect of the loan product might find themselves in a sticky
situation if those alumni start seeing their investments evaporate.
